

# Overview

Background

Goals for the course

Goals for computer security

# Background

## What's your background?

- academic program
- security background/interest/practices

## My background

- education
- privacy and security research

3 / 18

I did my undergraduate degree here at Memorial; I know (and care about!) the program deeply. Then I went off to the University of Cambridge for my PhD, where I looked into some of the privacy problems with online social networking (TL;DR: there are a lot) and approaches by which we could build something better.

My graduate students and I work in privacy and security for real systems, very broadly defined. Specifically, we've done work in:

- security protocols
- operating systems
  - application sandboxing
  - cryptographic filesystems
  - security-enhanced hardware
- privacy and social networks (PhD, [IEEE Security & Privacy summary](#))
- applications:
  - full-motion video integrity
  - health privacy
  - marine systems

# Course goals

To pass! 😊

What are you looking for in this course?

**My goal: give an introduction to fundamental ideas.**

- "what every computer engineer should know about security"
- **not** a rigorous treatment of all aspects of computer security: foundation for further study with **some** in-depth exploration

4 / 18

To learn how to pass, please consult the [course outline](#)!

You won't come out of this course being an expert in computer security. Specifically, you should \_\_\_\_\_ call yourself a:

- cryptographer
- network defender
- penetration tester
- protocol designer
- secure "coder"

After completing this course, you should at least have the \_\_\_\_\_ with which to discuss security issues that come up in computer engineering.

# Course content

Introduction

Software security

Host security

Network security

Web security


5 / 18

The four content modules of the course will be approximately similar in length, although they may not be exactly the same in breadth or depth. We will be able to go deeper in some areas than in others.

# Course resources

## *Tools and Jewels* (van Oorschot)

- Hardcover from [Springer](#)
- Free PDFs from [PVO's website](#)



## *Security Engineering* (Anderson)

- Second edition [still available as free PDFs](#)



6 / 18

Everything that I'll expect you to know will be discussed in the lectures. Thus, I suggest that you \_\_\_\_\_ in these lectures of what we discuss and \_\_\_\_\_ immediately afterwards. Make sure that you \_\_\_\_\_ these ideas and, where possible, can \_\_\_\_\_ them.

In addition to the lecture materials, further reading is definitely encouraged! Rather than scouring YouTube, however, where you can find anybody to say anything, I'll point you at a couple of excellent (but still free) resources.

I am recommending a "textbook" for this course, but we won't be following it very strictly. It's a good book, though, so I'd definitely recommend checking it out. You can buy a hardcover version (which looks great on a shelf!) [from Springer](#), but Prof. Van Oorschot publishes PDFs of the book's chapters for free [on his website](#).

*Security Engineering* by Ross Anderson (no relation, apart from our [academic family tree](#)) is the most fun you'll ever have reading 1,000 pages. We'll use it as a reference, and it's another one to keep handy on your shelf.

# Course evaluation

Assignments: *individual* work ("I did this")

Labs: done in pairs

Case study or project: *self-directed* investigation

Midterm and exam

7 / 18

From the course outline:

“

*Students are expected to conduct themselves in all aspects of the course at the highest level of academic integrity. Any student found to commit academic misconduct will be dealt with according to the Faculty and University practices. More information is available at <http://www.mun.ca/engineering/undergrad/academicintegrity.php>.*

*Students are encouraged to consult the Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science Student Code of Conduct at <http://www.mun.ca/engineering/undergrad/academicintegrity.php> and Memorial University's Code of Student Conduct at <http://www.mun.ca/student/conduct>.*

”

The **case study (for undergrads) or project (for graduate students)** should be a self-directed investigation of a security topic: an attack, a vulnerability, a defensive technique, etc.

Undergraduate case studies should be \_\_\_\_\_ in nature. Graduate projects need to include an element of \_\_\_\_\_ and/or \_\_\_\_\_.

We will also have traditional written exams: a midterm and a final exam.

# Overview

Background

Goals for the course

Goals for computer security

# Security goals

Big question:

Is my system/network/data "secure"?

Big answer:

**No!**

9 / 18

Question asked by the ignorant: "bottom line, is it secure?"

If we want a more meaningful \_\_\_\_\_, we must ask a more meaningful  
\_\_\_\_\_.



# Security questions

Typical SE question:

Can the system do X?

Typical security question:

Can the system *prevent* X?

We'll do some negative thinking... but not always!

10 / 18

Negative thinking in two senses:

1. thinking about negative things,
2. thinking *in the negative* about what is *not* possible.

We won't *always* be thinking negatively: proper privacy and security practices can  
\_\_\_\_\_ amazing and even beautiful things!

# Thinking about security

Security properties: CIA[AAA]

Security policies

Security mechanisms

Security violations

Security activities

## CIA[AAA] properties

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Accountability

12 / 18

Confidentiality is often the first goal that people think of, but it's not always the most important. For example: believe it or not, I don't care all that much about the confidentiality of my bank account (maybe if I had more money than student debt, but that's not the case!). However, I care very much about the \_\_\_\_\_ of my bank balance and about the \_\_\_\_\_ of the banking system.

Understanding the security \_\_\_\_\_ we might want to have enables us to think clearly about...

# Security policy

What should happen

What should not happen

Separable from *mechanism*

13 / 18

e.g., an integrity policy: video evidence is what was taken, wasn't altered

e.g., "no lone access" vs cryptography, two-factor authentication...

Mechanism is "cool" (everyone loves words like \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_), but mechanism is not our first priority!

# Security mechanisms

- Techniques, systems, products, SOCs\*... wheel!
- Do your mechanisms give the **right properties**?
- Don't be vendor-led.
- Don't be mechanism-led.
- Start with the **policy**!



\* See: <https://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-do-socs-look-like-this.html>

14 / 18

We'll be introduced to lots of techniques in this course: stack smashing, memory safety, fuzzing, ASLR, ROP gadgets, DAC, MAC, ciphers, hashes, John the Ripper, biometrics, compartmentalization, digital signatures, protocols, double-ratcheting private messaging, VPNs, cross-site scripting, SQL injection, Onion sites...

Big screens make for exciting television.

Being vendor-led is OK if your goal is, "we want things that look shiny that are at least as expensive as what our competitors have." Speaking cynically, that's actually what some people's goal is: to show that they've put enough money or work into their system that they can't be fired if things go South. However, that's not a security goal: it's a job security goal!

Policy talks about what we \_\_\_\_\_... how do we talk about what we \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_?

# Security violations


*What's the worst that could happen?*

Threat

Vulnerability

Adversary

Attack



15 / 18

\_\_\_\_\_ "combination of circumstances and entities inclined to harm assets, i.e., cause security violations" (Oorschot)

\_\_\_\_\_ weakness that could allow a threat to be realized by an...

\_\_\_\_\_ a \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ (not a \_\_\_\_\_!) that wants to violate your policy via an...

\_\_\_\_\_ an adversary *exploits* one or more vulnerabilities (the *attack vector*) in order to bring the threatened harm about

# Security activities

## Proactive:

- Threat modeling and risk assessment
- Prevention and mitigation

## Reactive:

- Incident response and post-attack mitigation
- Attribution... and response

16 / 18

This course will focus on the \_\_\_\_\_ elements of this problem. How have attackers exploited vulnerabilities, and how can we use that knowledge to \_\_\_\_\_ that are \_\_\_\_\_ to attack?

Reactive elements of computer security are also important, but they aren't the focus of this course. Somebody absolutely needs to do \_\_\_\_\_, to identify \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. However, those things are mostly of interest to engineers insofar as they help us \_\_\_\_\_.